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THE REFORM OF THE INNOCENT CONSTRUCTION RULE
IN ILLINOIS
Chapski v. Copley Press
92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982)
BARBARA A. DONENBERG*
From 1962 until 1982, Illinois defamation law had been very
favorable for defendants. The state had become a virtual haven for
journalists.' This situation was the result of the Illinois Supreme
Court's adoption of the "innocent construction" rule in John v. Tribune
Co. 2 The rule, which was unique to Illinois,3 stated that if an allegedly
defamatory statement could possibly be given a nondefamatory mean-
ing as a determination of the judge, it would be nonactionableper se.4
Some commentators regarded the adoption of this rule as an attempt
by the Illinois Supreme Court to counter the pro-plaintiff bias that had
developed prior to John .5
Although some commentators have thought that the innocent con-
struction rule protected the press, 6 the rule has been subjected to sub-
stantial criticism. The rule encouraged journalists to write a potentially
defamatory statement ambiguously so that it could be given an inno-
cent interpretation and thus be ruled nondefamatory.7 While the rule
required judges to give the words their "natural and obvious" mean-
ing, 8 judges would instead concentrate on finding a possible innocent
interpretation of the words, and often strained to do so, thereby keep-
ing the case from the jury.9
The potential abuse of the rule and the constitutional protections
* B.A. University of Michigan, 1981; J.D. lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1984.
1. Chi. Law., Dec. 1982, at 5, col. 1.
2. 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
3. See Note, The Illinois Doctrine of Innocent Construction: 4 Minority of One, 30 U. CHI. L.
R~v. 524 (1963) [hereinafter cited as The Illinois Doctrine]. The majority rule in defamation is
that it is a question of law whether certain words are capable of a defamatory meaning and it is a
question of fact whether they were understood in a defamatory sense.
4. John v. Tribune Co., 24 IUI. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877
(1962).
5. See The Illinois Doctrine, supra note 3, at 526. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying
text.
6. Chi. Law., Dec. 1982, at 5, col. 2.
7. Id at 5, col. 1.
8. 24 Ill. 2d at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
9. See infra, notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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now given to defendants in defamation actions by the United States
Supreme Court10 led the Illinois Supreme Court to "modify"" the in-
nocent construction rule in 1982 in Chapski v. Copley Press.'2 The rule
as modified in Chapski requires judges to give allegedly defamatory
words an innocent construction only if it is reasonable to do so.' 3 The
rule still requires judges to make the initial determination and declare
the words nonactionable but only if an innocent interpretation can rea-
sonab y be found.
14
This case comment will trace the development and application of
the innocent construction rule in Illinois beginning with its common
law origins. The circumstance under which the rule was adopted in
Illinois will be set out. The use of the rule in Illinois since 1962 as well
as the changing circumstances in defamation law will be highlighted.
Chapski v. Copley Press will then be presented and analyzed. This
comment will conclude that although the innocent construction rule
had some validity when it was adopted in 1962, those circumstances no
longer exist. This comment will also conclude that although the Illinois
Supreme Court's reconsideration of the rule was necessary, the court
did not go far enough. The Illinois Supreme Court should have seized
the opportunity to overrule John and replace it with a reasonable con-
struction rule--the rule of the majority of jurisdictions.
15
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Defamation Law in Illinois Prior to John
The doctrine of innocent construction in defamation law is an out-
growth of the mitior sensus doctrine which developed in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. 16 The mitior sensus doctrine required that a
statement be held nondefamatory, and thus nonactionable, if such a
meaning could be "twisted" out of it. 17 During the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, a great number of defamation actions were brought
before the court.' 8 It has been suggested that the arbitrary rule of mitior
10. See infra, notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
11. Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 I11. 2d 344, 351, 442 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1982).
12. 92 I11. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982).
13. Id at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
14. Id
15. See infra note 48.
16. Note, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q. REv. 302, 404-08
(1924) [hereinafter cited as Defamation]. For further analysis of the common law development in
American defamation law, see Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3
COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903).
17. Defamation, supra note 16, at 407.
18. See Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051,
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sensus was adopted as an effective way to unclog the courts. 19 During
this time, when the mitior sensus doctrine flourished, courts went to
great lengths to find a nondefamatory meaning in an allegedly defama-
tory statement.20 The application of the doctrine resulted in "some re-
markable judicial acrobatics" in order to lessen the number of
defamation actions.
2'
In 1842, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the mitior sensus doc-
trine in McKee v. Ingalls.22 The court said that a better rule would be
"to hold the party responsible for the words in the sense in which he
spoke them. '23 The court further stated that if the meaning of a state-
ment is doubtful, the rest of the conversation can be used to explain
it.24
While it was clear that the Illinois Supreme Court had rejected the
common law doctrine of mitior sensus, there was still some uncertainty
as to what standard the court was adopting.25 It was unclear whether
the court was adopting a completely objective standard with the rele-
vance on the interpretation of the words by a third party, a completely
subjective standard with the relevance being whether the defendant in-
tended to defame the plaintiff, or a combination of the two standards.
In Nelson v. Borchenius,26 in 1869, the Illinois Supreme Court also
rejected what later became known as the "innocent construction"
1064-65 (1962); Symposium: Libel and Slander in Illinois, 43 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Libel and Slander].
19. Libel and Slander, supra note 18, at 3.
20. See The Illinois Doctrine, supra note 3, at 526.
21. Lovell, supra note 18, at 1064-65. An extreme example of the mitior sensus doctrine is
Holt v. Astrigg, 79 Eng. Rep. 161 (1608). In that case, the allegedly libelous words were "Sir
Thomas Holt struck his cook on the head with a cleaver, and cleaved his head, the one part lying
on the one shoulder, and another part on the other." While a reasonable person would interpret
these words as imputing murder, the court applied the mitior sensus doctrine and ruled otherwise.
The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and held that only an actionable trespass is im-
puted to the subject of the statement. Slander, the court said, must be direct. The court added,
"[N]otwithstanding such wounding, the party may yet be living, and it is then but trespass." In
other words, the defendant might have merely meant that Sir Thomas Holt had subjected his cook
to a temporary inconvenience and had taken an unwarrantable liberty with part of the cook's
property by splitting the cook's head in two, "for which act the cook, on recovering from his
shoulders and reuniting the undivided moities of his cleft skull, might sue his master in trespass."
H. BOWER, THE LAW OF ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 334 (1908).
22. 5 Ill. 30 (1842). The actionable words were "'You are a damned thief'; 'If you have got
money, you stole it'; 'I believe you are a damned thief'; 'I believe you will steal.' " Id at 32.
23. Id
24. Id at 33. See also Winchell v. Strong, 17 Ill. 597 (1886). The Illinois Supreme Court
held that to understand "the real intention of the defendant when he used the words charged," the
conversation held by defendant shortly after he accused the plaintiff of "stealing lumber" should
have been admitted into evidence. 17 III. at 602.
25. See Polelle, The Guilt of the "Innocent Construction Rule"in Illinois Defamation Law, I N.
ILL. U.L. REv. 181, 189 (1981).
26. 52 Ill. 236 (1869).
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rule;27 instead, the court adopted a reasonableness standard. 28 The
Nelson court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff where the defendant
had made false statements about the plaintiff personally and in his
trade as a merchant. The defendant had called the plaintiff a "villain, a
rascal, and a cheater, in his said business as a merchant. ' 29 The Nelson
court rejected the defendant's contention that a witness can only testify
as to what words were spoken and not what the witness understood the
words to mean.30 The court stated that the injury in an action for slan-
der occurs from the effect that the actionable words have on the listen-
ers.3t If a statement is ambiguous and listeners understand it in an
actionable sense, then the statement is actionable.32 The court said that
it is the duty of the speaker to avoid the use of language which would
be liable to a defamatory construction "in the minds of reasonable men
who might hear him."'33 Such a construction would not be conclusive
upon a jury, according to the court, but it would be "admissible in evi-
dence, as tending to show what meaning hearers of common under-
standing would and did ascribe to them.
'34
The Illinois Supreme Court further emphasized its move away
from the common law's mitior sensus approach in 1875 in Miller v.
Johnson .35 The defendant in Miller had falsely accused the plaintiff of
stealing "corn and oats from him."' 36 The court affirmed a verdict for
the plaintiff and refused to excuse the defendant's guilt by an explana-
tion that he did not intend by his words to impute the crime of larceny
to the plaintiff.37 The Miller court stated that a defendant could not use
27. Id at 238-40. The innocent construction rule is essentially the same as the common law
doctrine ofmitior serous, with the latter being a little more extreme. See, e.g., Holt v. Astrigg, 79
Eng. Rep. 161 (1608).
28. Polelle at 238.
29. Id at 237.
30. Id at 238.
31. Id
32. Id See also Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 I11. 405, 122 N.E. 587 (1919).
33. 52 Ill. at 238. See also Barnes v. Hamon, 71 Ill. 609 (1874) (the court took into account
innuendo and colloquium in determining that defendant's words were defamatory). If a statement
standing alone is defamatory, it is defamatory "on its face." However, a statement is also actiona-
ble if the defamatory meaning becomes apparent only by adding extrinsic facts. The plaintiff
pleads and proves such additional facts as inducement and establishes the defamatory meaning by
innuendo. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (5th ed. 1979).
Colloquium refers to the requirement that the defamatory statement is "of or concerning the
plaintiff." If it is not clear that the statement on its face refers to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may
introduce extrinsic facts that would lead a reasonable reader, listener, or viewer to perceive the
defamatory statement as referring to the plaintiff. Id at 240.
34. 52 Ill. at 238. The court further reasoned from this that if an alleged slander is in a
language unknown to a bystander, it cannot be actionable. Id at 239.
35. 79 Ill. 58 (1875).
36. Id at 59.
37. Id at 60.
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as a defense to a slander action that he did not intend to imply what
reasonable hearers presumptively understood to be the meaning of his
statement.
38
Another shift from the innocent construction rule was in 1879 in
Schmisseur v. Kreiiich.39 In Schmisseur, the actionable words were spo-
ken in French.40 The court, in affirming a verdict for plaintiff, rejected
defendant's argument that an allegation of whoring did not impute the
crime of fornication.41 The court stated that it would not put a
"strained construction" on words so as to relieve the speaker of liabil-
ity.42 The court held that "words are to be construed according to their
common acceptation.
43
The innocent construction rule was again rejected in the early part
of the twentieth century.44 For example, in Ogren v. Rockford Star
Printing Co. ,45 the Illinois Supreme Court held that "where words are
ambiguous or equivocal in meaning, the question of the meaning to be
ascribed to them is for the jury, although the question as to whether or
not any particular meaning is libelous is for the court."'46 It was clear at
this point that the court had adopted an objective or "reasonable con-
struction" standard for defamation actions.47 After 1925, the Illinois
Supreme Court did not address the innocent construction rule until
1962 with its landmark decision in John v. Tribune Co. 48 where it
38. Id.
39. 92 I11. 347 (1879).
40. Id at 351-52. The defendant said of the plaintiff: 'La flle, Kreilich, afait laputaine avec
mon garcon.' Translated, 'The girl, Kreilich, has acted (made) the whore with my boy.' 'Elle afail
la putaine a Belleville a S1. Louis, et au village.' Translated, 'She has acted (made) the whore in
Belleville, in St. Louis, and in the village.'
41. Id
42. Id at 352.
43. Id
44. People v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925); Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing
Co., 288 Il. 405, 122 N.E. 587 (1919); Ball v. Evening Am. Publishing Co., 237 I11. 592, 86 N.E.
1097 (1909).
45. 288 Ill. 405, 122 N.E. 587 (1919).
46. 288 I. at 412, 123 N.E. at 591.
47. Under a reasonable construction rule, the only function of the court is to determine
whether the words are reasonably capable of a defamatory interpretation. If they are, the jury
determines whether in fact the average reasonable hearer or reader understood the words as de-
famatory or innocent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (1977). This is the rule that
exists in the majority of states. See, e.g., Gray v. WALA-TV, 384 So. 2d 1062 (Ala. 1980); William
v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Terry v. Hubbell,
22 Conn. Supp. 248, 167 A.2d 919 (1960); Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Jones v. Walser, 107 N.H. 379, 222 A.2d 830 (1966); James v. Gannett, 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353
N.E.2d 834, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976); Corab v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899
(1971); Taylor v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 473 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); West-
ern States Title Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966); D.R.W. Corp. v. Cordes,
65 Wis. 2d 303, 222 N.W.2d 671 (1974).
48. 24 IIU. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
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adopted that rule.49
Curiously, the Illinois Supreme Court based its decision in John
on the decisions of some of the Illinois appellate courts in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries since none of its own precedent sup-
ported such a decision. 50 The first Illinois appellate court to give
credence to a form of the innocent construction rule was Young v. Rich-
ardson51 in 1879. In Young, the court relied on Cooley on Torts and
said that "It is a principle of law that 'words alleged to be libelous will
receive an innocent construction if they are fairly susceptible of it.' "52
This was only dictum, however, because the court did not rely on the
innocent construction rule when it reversed a jury verdict for a plaintiff
who had been reported to the county board of supervisors as having
falsely inflated his criminal conviction rate so as to increase his fees.
5 3
The recognition of the rule by the Young court was an anomaly
since later Illinois appellate courts until 1928 did not adhere to the in-
nocent construction rule.54 These courts instead followed the Illinois
Supreme Court precedent of reasonable construction or common ac-
ceptation. 55 Another problem with Young was that the court, when cit-
ing Cooley, ignored the second half of the quoted sentence which said
"and when it is uncertain whether they convey a defamatory imputa-
tion the question is one for the jury. ' 56 The court also ignored the
Illinois Supreme Court precedent which had clearly adopted a stan-
dard much different than an "innocent construction" rule, and the
court did not cite any authority to support its position on the rule.
57
It was not until 1928 in Fulrath v. Wolf 3 s that an Illinois appellate
court again applied the "innocent construction" rule to a defamation
action.59 The defendant in Fulrath wrote a letter to the plaintiff which
stated that due to a thorough investigation of plaintiff's business prac-
49. Id at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
50. See, e.g., Piacenti v. Williams Press, 347 Ill. App. 440, 107 N.E.2d 45 (1942); Dilling v.
Illinois Pub. & Printing Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N.E.2d 635 (1930); Fulrath v. Wolfe, 250 Ill.
App. 130 (1928).
51. 4 IlL. App. 364 (1879).
52. Id at 374.
53. Id The Young court reversed the jury verdict for the plaintiff due to the variance of proof
from the declarations filed by the plaintiff and the error of the trial court in excluding defendant's
conditional privilege of reporting the matter to a public board. Id. at 375-76.
54. See, e.g., Burke v. Stewart, 81 111. App. 506 (1898); Tottleben v. Blankenship, 58 IUl. App.
47 (1894); Bihler v. Gockley, 18 I11. App. 496 (1886); Clifford v. Cochrane, 10 Il1. App. 265 (1882);
Foval v. Hallett, 10 Ill. App. 265 (1881).
55. See supra cases cited in note 55.
56. T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 208 (1879).
57. See Polelle, supra note 25, at 191-92.
58. 250 Ill. App. 130 (1928).
59. Id at 135.
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tices, the defendant was discontinuing his business relationship with
plaintiff.60 While the plaintiff conceded that the letter itself was not
libelousper se,61 plaintiff contended that by adding certain innuendos
62
from evidence of prior conversations between plaintiff and defendant,
the letter became libelous.63 The plaintiff alleged that with the innuen-
dos, defendant referred to the plaintiff in the letter as a "gypper."
'64
The court held that slanderous words could not be read into the letter
so as to make the otherwise nonlibelous letter libelous. Libel, the court
stated, must be based on the written words alone. The court, para-
phrasing Young, held, "The words of an alleged libel, where suscepti-
ble of it, will receive an innocent construction by interpretation. ' 65
The adoption of the innocent construction rule by the Fulrath
court was based on weak precedent.66 The court relied on Young,
which itself had no real basis for recognizing the innocent construction
rule.67 The Fulrath court also relied on Harkness v. Chicago Daily
News,68 which applied a reasonable construction rule and not an "in-
nocent construction" rule.69 The Harkness court stated that in order to
determine the meaning of an allegedly libelous statement:
[E]ach phrase must be construed in light of the entire publication.
The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious mean-
ing .... The test is, what would men or ordinary understanding
infer from the words of the libel? . . . If the words of the libel are
fairly susceptible of any defamatory meaning . . . to sustain a de-
murrer to a declaration. . . upon the ground that they form no cause
of action, would be error.
70
Furthermore, Fulrath ignored Illinois Supreme Court precedent of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries which had clearly rejected the mitior
sensus doctrine, the prototype of the innocent construction rule. 7'
The Illinois appellate court cases that followed Fulrath were in-
60. Id
61. A publication is libelousper se when it is defamatory on its face. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 825 (5th ed. 1979).
62. See supra note 34.
63. 250 Ill. App. at 135.
64. Id
65. Id.
66. See Polelie, supra note 25, at 195. The court relied on Young v. Richardson, 4 I11. App.
364 (1879), and Harkness v. Chicago Daily News Co., 102 Ill. App. 162 (1902).
67. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
68. 102 Ill. App. 162 (1902).
69. Id. at 165.
70. Id.
71. People v. Spielman, 236 Ill. App. 637, af'/d, 318 II. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925); Ball v.
Evening Am. Publishing Co., 142 Ill. App. 656 (1908), rev'd, 237 I11. 592, 86 N.E. 1097 (1909);
Nelson v. Borchenius, 52 Ill. 236 (1869).
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consistent in their application of the innocent construction rule. While
some cases adopted the Fulrath analysis and ignored the Illinois
Supreme Court,72 others instead followed the more established Illinois
Supreme Court precedent of reasonable construction.
73
John v. Tribune Co.
A major turning point in Illinois defamation law came in 1962
with the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in John v. Tribune Co. 74 The
Illinois Supreme Court in John adopted the innocent construction rule
which states that an "article is to be read as a whole and the words
given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words al-
legedly libelous which are capable of being read innocently must be so
read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law."
'75
The libel action in John arose from two newspaper articles con-
cerning a police raid on a building in Chicago. The police arrested the
owner of the apartment building and several women in the owner's
apartment for prostitution. The newspaper articles reported that the
owner of the apartment building was Dorothy Clark, who was 57 years
old and also known as Delores Reising, Eve Spiro, and Eve John. The
articles also said that Dorothy Clark was a "former girl friend of Tony
Accardo, Capone gangster," that she kept a "disorderly house," and
that she sold liquor without a license.
76
The plaintiff, a 27 year old woman, contended that the articles
were "of and concerning her" because her name was Eve Spiro John.
Her maiden name was Eve Spiro and her name at the time that the
articles were written was Eve John. The plaintiff was the only person
by that name who lived at the address in the article, but she was not
involved with the raid or with any of the immoral activities of her
72. See, e.g., Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 17 Ill. App. 2d 365, 150 N.E.2d 202 (1958);
Epton v. Vail, 2 Il. App. 2d 287, 119 N.E.2d 410 (1954); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App.
293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
73. See, e.g., Proesel v. Myers Pub. Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 501, 165 N.E.2d 352 (1960); Parker v.
Kirkland, 298 Ill. App. 340, 18 N.E.2d 709 (1939); Creitz v. Bennett, 273 Ill. App. 88 (1933).
74. 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
75. Id at 442, N.E.2d at 108. The court did not deal with the question of whether words that
are not defamatory are still actionable as lible per quod if the plaintiff can show special damages.
This caused confusion in later courts applying John. See American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago
Veterinary Medical Assn., 106 Ill. App. 3d 626, 435 N.E.2d 1297 (1982); Newell v. Field Enter., 91
Ill. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1980). In general, in defamation actions, it is a question of law
whether certain words are capable of a defamatory meaning, and it is a question of fact for the
jury whether the words were understood in a defamatory sense. The effect of the innocent con-
struction rule is to take words away from the jury if they are liable to an innocent construction and
thus nonactionable as a matter of law. See The Illinois Doctrine, supra note 3, at 526.
76. Id at 439, 181 N.E.2d at 106.
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landlord.77
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Tribune Com-
pany.78 The court reasoned that when the term "alias" or "also
known" is used in a publication, the first name given is the subject of
the publication.79 The alias names cannot be read as "of and concern-
ing" the subject of the publication.80 In adopting the innocent con-
struction rule, the court in John relied solely on Illinois appellate court
decisions8' and decisions of federal courts interpreting Illinois law.
8 2
Not only did the Illinois Supreme Court not cite any of its prior deci-
sions in support of the innocent construction rule, it completely ignored
its prior decisions which had rejected the adoption of such a rule.
3
Although the Illinois Supreme Court did not have any strong pre-
cedent for establishing the innocent construction rule, there were policy
reasons for it. In 1962, defamation law had a pro-plaintiff bias.8 4 For
example, while truth was a defense to an action for defamation, the
presumption that an allegedly defamatory statement was false was dif-
ficult to rebut, and malice had been irrebuttably presumed.8 5 Further-
more, if the plaintiff had been damaged, the defendant was liable in
certain circumstances even though his conduct was completely inno-
cent.8 6 Therefore, strict liability existed in defamation law.8 7 Also, if
the publication was written or if the alleged harm fell into one of the
slanderper se8 8 categories, damages were presumed.
8 9
Defamation Law in Illinois after John
Since the Illinois Supreme Court decision in John, Illinois appel-
late courts and federal courts sitting in Illinois have followed what they
considered to be the innocent construction rule as announced in John .90
The Illinois Supreme Court had also reaffirmed the rule in its later
77. Id at 440, 181 N.E.2d at 107. This has been considered one of the greatest coincidences
in a reported libel case. The Illinois Doctrine, supra note 3, at 527.
78. 24 Ill. 2d at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
79. Id at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
80. Id
81. See cases cited at 24 IU1. 2d at 442-43, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
82. See cases cited at 24 IUl. 2d at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
83. Id at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
84. See The Illinois Doctrine, supra note 3, at 527.
85. 24 Ill. 2d at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
86. Id at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
87. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 322 (1974). See also infra notes 128-30 and
accompanying text.
88. See infra note 96.
89. The Illinois Doctrine, supra note 3, at 527.
90. See, e.g., Rasky v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 577, 431 N.E.2d
1055 (1981); Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 11. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979); Loril-
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decisions.9'
According to the interpretations given to the rule in John, an inno-
cent construction will be given to an allegedly defamatory statement if
the words are susceptible of it or if the statement is ambiguous. 92 The
rule has been held to apply to both libel 93 and slander94 actions. Courts
have held that under the innocent construction rule, in order for a dec-
laration to be libelper se,9 5 it must be read in the best possible light 96
and stripped of innuendo. 97 The innocent construction rule had also
been applied to issues of colloquium 98 when the plaintiff alleged that
the defamatory statement was "of or concerning" him. 99 Furthermore,
the rule has been held to apply even when the defendant made the
statement maliciously. 00
Since the adoption of the innocent construction rule, Illinois courts
would frequently go to great lengths to find an innocent interpretation.
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statement "he
was a lousy agent" was not slanderousper se because it could be con-
strued innocently to mean that the "plaintiff did not properly or satis-
factorily represent the company and that there had been a 'lousy' or
generally unsatisfactory agency relationship."1 0' The court stated that
lard v. Field Enters., 65 Ill. App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1 (1965); Porcella v. Time, Inc., 300 F.2d 162
(7th Cir. 1962); Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
91. See, e.g., Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980), cert. denied451 U.S.
911 (1980); Troman v. Wood, 62 I11. 2d 184, 390 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Valentine v. North Am. Co.
for Life & Health Ins., 60 I11. 2d 168, 328 N.E.2d 265 (1974).
92. See Altman v. Amoco Oil Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 104, 406 N.E.2d 142 (1980).
93. See, e.g., Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 111. 2d 354, 243 N.E.2d 217 (1968).
94. See, e.g., Valentine v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 60 Ill. 2d 168, 328 N.E.2d
265 (1974).
95. For a declaration to be ruled as libelousper se, it must be false or so obviously damaging
to the plaintiff that proof of injurious character can be and is dispensed with. Reed v. Albanese,
78 Ill. App. 2d 53, 223 N.E.2d 419 (1966). If the statement is not libelous per se, it can be ruled
libelous per quodif the plaintiff can prove up special damages. Kirk v. Village of Hillcrest, 31 111.
App. 3d 1063, 335 N.E.2d 535 (1975). In most states, libel per quod can be proved by innuendo
from extrinsic evidence. In Illinois, however, the innocent construction rule does not permit the
use of innuendo.
Libel per se is often defined by the categories that defined slander per se at common law:
words that impute (I) the commission of a criminal offense or; (2) an infection with a communica-
ble disease which, if true, would exclude one from society or; (3) inability to perform or want of
integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment or; (4) are such as to prejudice a
particular person in his profession or trade. Kirk v. Village of Hillcrest, 31 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 335
N.E.2d 535 (1975).
96. Wexler v. Chicago Tribune Co., 69 Ill. App. 3d 610, 387 N.E.2d 892 (1979).
97. Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 Ill. App. 3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
98. See supra note 34.
99. John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962);
Belmonte v. Rubin, 68 Ill. App. 3d 700, 386 N.E.2d 904 (1979).
100. See Altman v. Amoco Oil Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 104, 406 N.E.2d 142 (1980).
101. Valentine v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 60 Ill. 2d 168, 171, 328 N.E.2d 265,
267 (1974).
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the statement in context does not imply that the plaintiff was unquali-
fied or unskilled in his profession.
0 2
An appellate court held that labeling plaintiffs as "rip-off specula-
tors" was not libelous per se. 10 3 According to the court, the statement
could be read innocently with "rip-off' meaning "exploitation" and
"speculators" as referring to someone who had entered a "business
transaction or other venture from which the profits, return of invest-
ment, capital, or other goods are conjectural."' i°4
In another case where the plaintiff had been referred to as a "slum
landlord" or "slumlord," the court held that the statement could be
innocently construed to mean that the "plaintiff owned buildings in a
poor and dirty neighborhood" and thus was nonactionable. 0 5
While all of the Illinois courts since John have followed the inno-
cent construction rule, the rule received criticism, especially in recent
years.' 0 6 Some courts had, in effect, unintentionally modified the inno-
cent construction rule by demanding that an innocent interpretation be
given a statement only when the words are reasonably susceptible of
it.107 For example, in Moricoli v. Schwartz, 10 8 an Illinois appellate
court refused to apply the innocent construction rule where the plaintiff
had been referred to as a "fag."' 0 9 The court stated that the term "fag,"
when used as a noun in the United States, is "reasonably susceptible"
of only one meaning, which is that the person is a homosexual. "l0 The
court reasoned that to suggest a different meaning"' would serve only
"to further tax the court to espouse a naivet6 unwarranted under the
circumstances." 112
In some appellate cases there had been indications that Illinois'
innocent construction rule was thought to be in need of review, but
these courts held that the Illinois Supreme Court was the proper forum
102. Id at 171, 328 N.E.2d at 267.
103. Bruck v. Cincotta, 56 I11. App. 3d 260, 265, 371 N.E.2d 874, 878 (1977).
104. Id. at 265, 371 N.E.2d at 878.
105. Rasky v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 577, 582, 431 N.E.2d 1055,
1058 (1981).
106. See generally Polelle, supra note 25..
107. See, e.g., Tunney v. American Broadcasting Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 769, 441 N.E.2d 86
(1982); Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979); Moricoli v.
Schwartz, 46 I11. App. 3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1977); Roemer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 25 IlL. App. 3d
606, 323 N.E.2d 582 (1975).
108. 46 Ill. App. 3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
109. Id at 482-83, 361 N.E.2d at 76.
110. Id
1i1. The court consulted WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (unabridged ed. 1966) which gave several other definitions of the word "fag" such as
"cigarette," "to become weary," "a fatiguing task." Id at 483, 361 N.E.2d at 75.
112. Id at 483, 361 N.E.2d at 76.
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for a revision of the rule. 1 3 In a 1982 appellate decision, the court
stated that the innocent construction rule was "unsettled" and the court
mentioned that it had certain reservations concerning the rule." 4 The
court, thus, chose to decide the case on other grounds.'" 5
The innocent construction rule, however, serves some beneficial
ends. The main argument for its support is that the innocent construc-
tion rule encourages "the robust discussion of daily affairs" and it
reduces litigation."t 6 Another important benefit is that the innocent
construction rule comports with the constitutional concerns of encour-
aging freedom of expression." 7 Furthermore, it has been asserted that
free speech is not limited to compliments. "18 If this were not the case, it
was felt, there would be "no meaningful exchange of ideas."'"19 It was
believed that "members of a free society must be able to express candid
opinions and make personal judgments. And those opinions and judg-
ments may be harsh or critical--even abusive-yet still not subject the
speaker or writer to civil liability."' 120
Constitutional Protections in Defamation Law
Since 1962, many changes have taken place in the area of defama-
tion law, outside of the innocent construction rule. These changes have
aided defendants in defamation actions and have given defendants
some of the protections that they did not have when the court decided
John. In 1964, in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 121 the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution re-
quires a public official to prove with "convincing clarity" that an
113. Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 I11. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979); Vee See
Constr. Co. v. Jensen & Halstead Ltd., 79 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 399 N.E.2d 79 (1979).
114. American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Ass'n., 106 Ill. App. 3d 626,
630-31, 435 N.E.2d 1297, 1301 (1982).
115. Id at 630-31, 435 N.E.2d at 1301. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defend-
ants on the grounds of conditional privilege. Id at 634, 435 N.E.2d at 1303. See also Allen v. Ali,
105 I11. App. 3d 887, 435 N.E.2d 167 (1982), where the court refused to rely on the innocent
construction rule.
116. Dauw v. Field Enters., 78 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71, 397 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1979).
117. Id at 71, 397 N.E.2d at44.
118. Sloan v. Hatton, 66 Ill. App. 3d 41, 42, 383 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1978).
119. Id
120. Id See also Byars v. Kolodziej, 48 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1017, 363 N.E.2d 628, 629 (1978),
where the court held that not every expression of opinion about a person's capabilities or qualifi-
cations constitute a defamation even though the subject may be severely injured in his own
conception.
121. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times case arose out of a civil rights demonstration
in Alabama. The Times published a paid advertisement which was signed by a number of promi-
nent individuals. The advertisement accused the police of misconduct in dealing with the demon-
stration. Sullivan, the police commissioner, brought an action for libel, alleging that he was
personally defamed as one of the persons responsible for the demonstration.
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allegedly defamatory publication was made with "actual malice"
before he can recover damages. 122 "Actual malice" was defined by the
Court to require that the statement was made with "knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'
' 23
This rule was based on the free speech and free press guarantees re-
quired by the first amendment. 24 The New York Times rule was made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 25 The
Court feared that without the rule, public criticism would be hampered
and the media would engage in self-censorship.
26
Another important United States Supreme Court case on defama-
tion was the 1974 decision of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 127 The Court
affirmed the New York Times rule as applied to public officials and
public figures, but held that the "state interest in compensating injury
to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule
should obtain with respect to them."' 28 In Gertz, the Court established
that statements made about matters of general or public interest were
not deserving of constitutional protection. The Court held that "as
long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual."1
29
In 1975, the Illinois Supreme Court for the first time since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz, was faced with a libel
action brought by a private individual arising out of an event in the
public interest in Troman v. Wood.' 30 The Troman Court recognized
that Gertz gave them the authority to choose whatever standard of lia-
bility for private plaintiffs it wanted as long as the court did not impose
liability without fault; thus, the Illinois Supreme Court decided to
adopt a negligence standard for libel actions in these circumstances. 13
The court believed that a negligence standard adequately protected the
interest of a free press while at the same time allowed the individual to
122. Id at 279-80.
123. Id
124. Id at 264.
125. Id
126. Id at 269. In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the actual malice test to public figures.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
127. 418 U.S. 322 (1974).
128. Id at 343.
129. Id at 347.
130. 62 IU. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
131. Id at 197, 340 N.E.2d at 298.
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vindicate his good name. 32 The question under the standard of ordi-
nary negligence is whether the defendant had reasonable grounds to
believe that his statement was true. 33 The court further held that neg-
ligence may form the basis of liability for private plaintiffs regardless of
whether the publication related to a matter of public or general
interest. 134
CHAPSKI V. COPLEY PRESS
Facts of the Case
In Chapski, the libel action arose out of a series of newspaper arti-
cles which appeared in the Dailey Courier News, a local Elgin, Illinois,
newspaper, during the period of February 8, 1979, through January 25,
1980.13. There were thirteen articles published on eleven different
dates. Most of the articles purported to summarize and clarify the judi-
cial proceedings and events which preceded the death on February 2,
1979, of Kristie Hubbard, a two-year-old victim of child abuse. Plain-
tiff, Robert A. Chapski, an attorney, represented Kathleen Hubbard,
the child's mother, in juvenile and divorce proceedings. Chapski also
represented Norman Platter, the mother's boyfriend who was accused
in the beating death of the child.
136
Chapski alleged in his eleven count complaint that the defend-
ants 37 "seized upon this unfortunate set of circumstances to wrongfully
and maliciously and with intent to defame and injure the plaintiff in his
reputation, caused to be published [in the Daily Courier News] false,
defamatory, libelous articles and editorials."
38
The first article, titled "Child Custody Battle Sad as Child's Death
Itself," stated that the custody hearing which gave custody of the child
to her mother was "impromptu" and was attended by only the child's
mother and Chapski. 139 The article also quoted an assistant public de-
fender as saying "it's my feeling that when an attorney comes in with a




135. Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 345, 442 N.E.2d 195, 196 (1982).
136. Id at 345-46, 442 N.E.2d at 196.
137. See infra text accompanying note 160.
138. Chapski v. Copley Press, 100 IUI. App. 3d 1012, 1013, 427 N.E.2d 638, 639 (1981), rev'd
andrem'd, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982).
139. Appellant's Petition for Leave to Appeal at 7, Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 IUI. 2d 344, 442
N.E.2d 195 (1982).
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proper notice to other parties."1' 4
Another article accused Chapski of manipulating the court pro-
ceedings in September 1978 to get the child's custody awarded to her
mother.141 The article rhetorically asked a series of questions implying
that Chapski was acting immorally or unethically.1
42
The Courier News also printed an article titled, "Who's To Blame?
Many Questions in Baby's Death."'' 43 The article accused Chapski of
not giving proper notice about the custody hearing to the attorneys who
represented Mr. Hubbard, the child's father.44 The paper quoted Mr.
Hubbard's attorney as making indirect reference to Chapski when he
said, "'I think in custody cases a lawyer has a responsibility to human
life above that to his client. I also think that we as lawyers have an
obligation to the Court to see that justice is done.' "1145 The article also
quoted Mr. Hubbard's attorney as advising Mr. Hubbard to get local
counsel because "he felt someone was 'going in the back door in Kane
County.' ",146
The article titled "To Clear the Record" purported to summarize
the events reported in previously published articles, and it accused
Chapski of not following several procedures involved in custody hear-
ings. 14 7 The article also stated that "it is agreed he had no legal re-
quirement to do any of these things. Every lawyer contacted by me
said they would assume a moral obligation to do so.
''1 48
The article titled "Legal Report Card: F" discussed the Kristie
Hubbard case as well as the experiences of five attorneys "with a shaky
legal system that condones any lawyer who skirts the ethics of their [sic]
140. Appellant's Petition for Leave to Appeal at 7. The February 9, 1979, article stated that
Chapski, after being refused a bond reduction for Norman Platter from one judge, said he would
file motions in another court for reduction. The article also stated that in August 1978 the custody
of the child had been taken from Mrs. Hubbard "reportedly because of abuse of the child by
Platter," but in September the child had been returned to her mother in an "unscheduled hear-
ing." Id
141. Id
142. Id The article asked:
Could he not have known of the abuse already testified to and which was repeated days
later before Judge Joseph McCarthy, who as part of the mother's divorce proceeding was
deciding on the custody of the child? Can it be there was no legal responsibility for
Chapski to inform McCarthy of the alleged abuse? No moral obligation? Is this the way
the law is supposed to work or does the designation "officer of the court" place some
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profession."1 49 The article further quoted one lawyer as saying that the
Kristie Hubbard case is "'the culmination of several years of these she-
nanigans,'". . . "This has been going on continually. Now it's gone
too far. Somebody's dead.' "150
Chapski claimed that the various articles implied that he "was
guilty of a violation of the law, morals and integrity, whereas in truth,
he was guilty of no such violations."' 5 1 Chapski also contended that at
the time of the publication of the articles the defendants knew or by
exercise of reasonable care could and would have known that the state-
ments they made concerning him were false.152 In support of his asser-
tion that the articles were false, Chapski stated that the court had
granted custody to his client on September 14, 1978, when all parties
and their attorneys were present before the court. 53 The official police
report confirmed that custody had been awarded to Mrs. Hubbard on
September 14, 1978, and not September 21, 1978.1
54
A group of local citizens formed in response to the article pub-
lished in the Daily Courier News, 155 which prompted the Attorney Re-
gistration and Disciplinary Commission to conduct hearings. The
commission found Chapski to be innocent of the various accusations
made by the defendants. 56 On January 25, 1980, the defendants re-
ceived a copy of the commission's opinion and had an opportunity to
retract the allegedly false and libelous statements. 57 The defendants
instead published another article about Chapski which stated, "The bar
association asked for the investigation after several area attorneys ques-
149. Id at 10.
150. Id On Feb. 28, 1979, an article was published which included the following quotation,
"Citing evidence of abuse, a 16th Circuit Court Judge had ordered the girl taken from her
mother's custody, but the child was returned in an unscheduled hearing before another Judge a
short time later. . . . Several lawyers have questioned the propriety of that unscheduled hear-
ing." Id
On March 9, 1979, the newspaper reported that the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission was investigating a complaint about Chapski's conduct during court proceedings pre-
ceding the child's death. The article compared the first step in the investigation, review by an
inquiry board, to a grand jury in a criminal proceeding. Id at 10-11.
The articles published on June 27, 1979, and September 30, 1979, implied that Chapski was
responsible for the child's death because of the way he represented Mrs. Hubbard in the various
court proceedings. The article also made further mention of the "unscheduled hearings." Id
151. Id
152. Id
153. Id at 12.
154. Id
155. Id A group of people formed "The Concerned Citizens for Kristies" as a response to the
article in the Daily Courier News. Chapski alleged that this group aided and abetted the defend-
ants' cause to defame plaintiffs character and reputation by writing to various Illinois state au-
thorities including the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois. Id.
156. Id at 13.
157. Id
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tioned the propriety of the legal proceedings which gave Kristie back to
Mrs. Hubbard's care."'
58
Chapski filed the libel action in the Circuit Court of Kane County,
seeking damages against defendants, the Copley Press, the Daily Cou-
rier News, an editor and publisher, a reporter, and the editor. 59
Lower Courts' Opinions
The trial court applied the innocent construction rule to the al-
leged defamatory statements and declared them nonactionable as a
matter of law.160 The court stated that the main thrust of the articles
was directed to and critical of the court system as it related to the cus-
tody proceedings of Kristie Hubbard.' 6 ' The court further stated that in
the articles the defendants did not charge Chapski with any illegal acts
nor did they suggest Chapski's incompetence in his profession as an
attorney-which would be actionable.162 The court concluded that the
articles were merely a constitutionally protected free expression of the
opinion of the defendants that "justice was not served" due to the man-
ner in which the custody proceedings were conducted and the manner
in which Chapski was allowed to represent his client because of the
failing of the court system. 163 The court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss. 164
The Appellate Court for the Second District of Illinois affirmed
the decision of the trial court. 65 The appellate court applied the inno-
cent construction rule to the allegedly defamatory statements and de-
termined that they were susceptible of being construed innocently.
66
The court stated that characterizing the hearing as "impromptu" could
be construed as a criticism of the court system rather than the plain-
tiff.16 7 According to the court, the quotation from the assistant public
defender which alleged that proper notice was not given 68 was critical
of the judge and not the plaintiff.
69
The article which accused Chapski of manipulating the court sys-
158. Id at 14.
159. Id
160. Chapski v. Copley Press, No. 80 L 82 at 6.
161. Id at 4.
162. Id at 6.
163. Id.
164. Id at7.
165. 100 11. App. 3d at 1020, 427 N.E.2d at 644.
166. Id at 1016-20, 427 N.E.2d at 641-42.
167. Id at 1017, 427 N.E.2d at 642.
168. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
169. 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1017, 427 N.E.2d at 642.
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tem, 70 according to the court, merely inquired whether plaintiff had
any legal or moral responsibility to do certain things, but did not ac-
cuse him of any impropriety.' 7' The accusation that Chapski did not
give the other attorney proper notice was construed innocently because
the statement did not accuse Chapski of a deliberate failing. 172 The
statement "he felt someone was going in the back door in Kane
County"' 73 was held by the appellate court to be ambiguous and thus
nonactionable. 74 The article entitled "To Clear the Record . . . 175
was construed innocently because although it stated that some lawyers
would assume a moral obligation, it did not imply that Chapski lacked
integrity for failing to do so. 176 The court held that the article entitled
"Legal Report Card: F"'177 was a criticism of the legal system and not
Chapski. 178 Furthermore, the court held that the title of that article
was an opinion and therefore not actionable. 179
Illinois Supreme Court Opinion
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate and circuit
courts and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Kane County. 8
0
In reaching its decision, the court traced the innocent construction rule
in Illinois since its adoption in John.'8 ' The court noted that the rule, as
stated in John, was merely obiter dictum.182 Furthermore, the court
stressed that since that time the rule had been applied frequently in the
Illinois appellate courts, the Illinois Supreme Court, and federal courts
sitting in Illinois but not in a uniform fashion. 83 The court found that
170. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
171. 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1017-18, 427 N.E.2d at 642.
172. Id at 1018, 427 N.E.2d at 643.
173. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
174. 100 IUl. App. 3d at 1018, 427 N.E.2d at 643.
175. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
176. 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1018, 427 N.E.2d at 643.
177. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
178. 100 I11. App. 3d at 1018-19, 427 N.E.2d at 643.
179. Id
180. 92 Ill. 2d at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
181. Id at 346-49, 442 N.E.2d at 197.
182. Id at 347, 442 N.E.2d at 196. Obiter dictum refers to words of an opinion which are not
necessary for the decision of the case and are not binding as precedent. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 967 (5th ed. 1979). In other words, the innocent construction rule was not the holding of
John.
183. 92 InI. 2d at 348, 442 N.E.2d at 196-97. See, e.g., Rasky v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 577, 431 N.E.2d 1055 (1981); Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91 111. App.
3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1980); Garber-Pierre Food Prods., Inc. v. Crooks, 78 Ill. App. 3d 356, 397
N.E.2d 211 (1979); Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979);
Bruck v. Cincotta, 56 11. App. 3d 260, 371 N.E.2d 874 (1977); Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 111. App. 3d
481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1977); Watson v. Southwest Messenger Press, Inc., 12 I11. App. 3d 968, 299
N.E.2d 409 (1973); Delis v. Sepsis, 9 Ill. App. 3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138 (1972); Lorillard v. Field
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the rule had often been applied over vigorous objections. 84 The court
also found that the innocent construction rule had been applied to both
libel l85 and slander, 8 6 to the determination of whether the language is
actionable per se, 187 and to the use of colloquium. 88 The court also
noted that several commentators had criticized the innocent construc-
tion rule' 89 and that such a rule exists in only a few states. 190
In its analysis, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the justifica-
tions for the innocent construction rule include the desirable effects of
mitigating the harshness of the doctrine of strict liability which existed
in defamation law prior to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,'9' and, more
important, the rule also "comports with the constitutional interests of
free speech and free press and encourages the robust discussion of daily
affairs." 92
The principal criticism of the rule, the court emphasized, is that,
like the mitior sensus doctrine, "courts generally strain to find unnatu-
ral but possibly innocent meanings of words where such a construction
is clearly unreasonable and a defamatory meaning is far more prob-
able."' 193 Construing a publication in an "unreasonable manner" so as
to give it an innocent interpretation, the court emphasized, is "incom-
patible with the rule's requirement that words be given their 'natural
and obvious meaning.' ,194 The court noted that this conffict which is
contained in the definition itself had been resolved in some cases, "per-
Enters., Inc., 65 I11. App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d i (1965); see also Porcella v. Time, Inc., 300 F.2d 162
(7th Cir. 1962); Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. I11. 1981).
184. See, e.g., Levinson v. Time, Inc., 89 IlL. App. 3d 338, 411 N.E.2d 1118 (1980); Kakuris v.
Klein, 88 I11. App. 3d 597, 410 N.E.2d 984 (1980); Vee See Constr. Co. v. Jensen & Halstead, Ltd.,
79 I11. App. 3d 1084, 399 N.E.2d 278 (1979); Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452,
395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979).
185. See, e.g., Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 11. 2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217 (1968).
186. See, e.g., Valentine v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 60 Ill. 2d 168, 328 N.E.2d
265 (1974).
187. Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979).
188. John v. Tribune Co., 42 IUl. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962);
Belmonte v. Rubin, 68 I11. App. 3d 700, 386 N.E.2d 904 (1979).
189. See, e.g., Polelle, supra note 25; Libel and Slander, supra note 18; The Illinois Doctrine,
supra note 3; Stonecipher & Trager, The Impact of Gertz on the Law of Libel in Illinois. S. ILL.
U.L.J. 73 (1979).
190. The rule or variations thereof remain the law in only a few states. 92 Iln. 2d at 348, 442
N.E.2d at 196-97. See Monnin v. Wood, 86 N.M. 460, 525 F.2d 387 (1974); Walker v. Kansas City
Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966); Steffes v. Crawford, 143 Mont. 43, 386 P.2d 842 (1963);
Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio 549, 183 N.E.2d 391 (1956); Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight, 74 Okla.
359, 50 P.2d 350 (1935); see also England v. Automatic Canteen Co. of America, 349 F.2d 989 (6th
Cir. 1966).
191. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
192. 92 I11. 2d at 350, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
193. Id at 350-51, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
194. Id at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
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haps unwittingly," by applying the innocent construction rule only
where the words are "reasonably susceptible" of an innocent construc-
tion or when the allegedly defamatory language is ambiguous. 95 The
court concluded that, because of the inconsistencies, inequities, and
confusion that have resulted from the interpretations and applications
of the rule as originally announced in John, and the broader protec-
tions that now exist to protect first amendment interests along with the
availability of the various privileges, 196 it was persuaded that a modifi-
cation of the innocent construction rule was necessary. 197 A modifica-
tion of the rule, according to the court, would better serve to protect the
individual's interest in vindicating his good name and reputation while
allowing the "breathing space" necessary for the beneficial exercise of
the first amendment guarantees.
19 8
The court, thus, held that:
[A] written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the
words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvi-
ous meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be
innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to
someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se.199
The court added that this is a preliminary determination which is a
question of law to be resolved by the court. Should the initial determi-
nation be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the court continued, the
question of whether the publication was in fact understood to be de-
famatory or to refer to the plaintiff is decided by the jury.
2z°
The Illinois Supreme Court determined that Chapski should be
remanded to the trial court which will apply the modified rule. The
court reasoned that since several opinions of the appellate courts have
in essence applied the modified rule, it would not be unfair, as the de-
fendants alleged, to apply it in Chapski. The court further noted that
the trial court, in applying the innocent construction rule, treated some
of the language as a constitutional expression of opinion. The court
pointed out, however, that the innocent construction rule requires lan-
guage to be treated as opinions only when that characterization is a
195. Id See, e.g., Altman v. Amoco Oil Co., 85 IUl. App. 3d 104, 406 N.E.2d 142 (1980).
196. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. For the various privileges, see Colson v.
Stieg, 89 I11. 2d 205, 443 N.E.2d 246 (1982); Blair v. Walker, 64 Ill. 2d 1, 349 N.E.2d 385 (1976);
Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines,
Inc., 41 11. 2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217 (1968); see also Catalano v. Pechous, 83 I11. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d
350 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1980).
197. 92 Ill. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
198. Id
199. Id at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
200. Id
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reasonable one.20
ANALYSIS
Actions for defamation involve several important and competing
interests. The interests of plaintiffs in vindicating their good names
must be weighed by the courts against the defendants' constitutionally
protected rights of free speech and free press along with the general
public's interest in receiving information of public concern. The gen-
eral public also has an interest in being exposed to a variety of different
viewpoints and opinions. The United States Supreme Court has made
several attempts to reach an equitable balance of these interests as seen
in New York Times and its progeny, and in Gertz.
20 2
Illinois has also attempted to deal with the competing interests in-
herent in defamation actions. The Illinois Supreme Court responded
to the Gertz directive in Troman and held that private individuals must
show negligence on the part of a defendant in making a defamatory
statement. While at first glance it might appear that Illinois was being
very sympathetic to plaintiffs, it must be emphasized that since 1962,
Illinois, unlike most other states, had the innocent construction rule
which made it very difficult for a plaintiff to prove that an allegedly
defamatory statement was even actionable.
The innocent construction rule had a curious beginning in Illinois.
It was used in some Illinois appellate courts before the Illinois Supreme
Court had adopted it and at a time when the Illinois Supreme Court
was not only advocating a different rule but had clearly rejected an
analysis of the sort associated with the innocent construction rule. 20 3
Furthermore, three years before Illinois "adopted" 2°4 the innocent con-
struction rule in 1962, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court
rejected such a rule in California.20 5 The California court stated that
an innocent construction rule "protects, not the innocent defamer
whose words are libelous, but the clever writer versed in the law of
defamation who deliberately casts a grossly defamatory imputation in
ambiguous language. 20 6
It appears from a close examination of John that the Illinois
201. Id
202. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 22-50 and accompanying text.
204. The rule as announced in John was obiler dictum. See Valentine v. North Am. Co. for
Life & Health Ins., 60 Ill. 2d 168, 172, 328 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1974) (Ward, J., dissenting). Later
courts did not follow the precise meaning of the words of the rule.
205. Macleod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959).
206. Id at 550-5 I, 343 P.2d at 44.
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Supreme Court wanted to adopt the innocent construction rule in 1962,
so it announced the rule in the first case that was arguably proper for it.
In 1962 there were justified policy reasons in favor of adopting an inno-
cent construction rule. It was considered necessary to counter the pro-
plaintiff bias that existed in defamation law at that time. 20 7 The Illinois
Supreme Court believed that a defendant in a defamation action
needed some protection and that the innocent construction rule would
properly balance the competing interests involved in a defamation
action.208
The innocent construction rule, however, did not succeed in bal-
ancing these interests. Justice Traynor's criticisms became applicable
in Illinois. Plaintiffs in Illinois since John were at a serious disadvan-
tage because courts often went to great lengths to find an innocent con-
struction in an allegedly defamatory statement. As the court in
Chapski pointed out, such a construction clearly went against the pre-
cise meaning of the rule announced in John 209 which directed courts to
give the words their "natural and obvious" meaning. The innocent
construction rule was being applied to allegations of both libel per se
and libel per quod Many defamation actions, where the plaintiff was
more likely than not defamed, therefore, were dismissed without the
case ever going before the jury. This result was also contrary to the
long established constitutional protection to reputation provided by the
United States210 and Illinois Constitutions. 21' The primary purpose of
an action for defamation is the vindication of the plaintiff's good
name.2
12
The Illinois Supreme Court realized this dilemma when it decided
Chapski in 1982. In Chapski, the court held that a modification of the
innocent construction rule was necessary. This was a proper finding in
light of the constitutional protections provided for defendants in defa-
207. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
209. 92 Ill. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
210. "Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 338 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). The individual's right to the protection of
his own good name
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protec-
tion of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individ-
ual States under the Ninth and Tenth amendments. But this does not mean that the right
is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basis of our Constitutional system.
Id at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring), quoted with approval in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 341 (1974). See also L. ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 8-9 (1978).
211. See Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 194, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1975). See also ILL.
CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 20 (1970).
212. L. ELDRIDGE, supra note 211, at 4.
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mation actions by New York Times and Gertz and the confusion associ-
ated with the rule as announced in John.
213
The Illinois Supreme Court modified the innocent construction
rule announced in John by requiring that allegedly defamatory lan-
guage be given an innocent construction only if it is a reasonable inter-
pretation. 214 As a result, Illinois no longer has an "innocent
construction" rule, but a "reasonable innocent construction" rule. The
effect of this modification, however, is questionable. The "modified"
rule still requires the judge to make the initial determination of
whether the allegedly defamatory language can be read innocently and
thus be nonactionable. The requirement of a reasonable construction
should prevent judges from straining to find an unnatural interpreta-
tion of the words. Since the interpretation of the words will be at the
discretion of the judge, there is still the possibility of "strained" inter-
pretations made under the guise of reasonableness.
While the modification of the innocent construction rule was nec-
essary, the Illinois Supreme Court did not go far enough in Chapski.
The court should have taken the opportunity to overrule John, get rid
of the innocent construction rule and adopt the rule which exists in the
majority of states. While both the majority rule215 and the Illinois rule
require the judge to make the initial determination concerning the de-
famatory nature of the language, the emphasis of that determination is
different. Under the majority rule, the judge decides whether the lan-
guage is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory interpretation, and, if
it is, the case goes to the jury despite any conceivable innocent interpre-
tation, to determine whether in fact the publication was understood to
be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff. In contrast, the Illinois rule
prevents a case from getting to the jury if there is any possible reason-
able innocent interpretation of the language.
The majority rule is the better rule because it achieves a more eq-
uitable balance between the competing interests inherent in defamation
actions. If a plaintiff can show a defamatory meaning, the statement
should go to the jury. The defendant will not be overly burdened by
such an approach since he is provided with adequate constitutional
protections. Such a rule would encourage the media and others to be
more careful in their statements, and the potential for "sloppy" 21 6 or
213. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. See also Polelle, supra note 25.
214. 92 IUl. 2d at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
215. See supra note 48.
216. See Chi. Law., Dec. 1982, at 5, col. 1.
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cleverly written 217 journalism would decrease because the majority
rules lessens the possibility of keeping ambiguous language-that
which could reasonably be read as being innocent or defamatory-
from the jury. By allowing plaintiffs the right to a jury trial, the major-
ity rule aids in the vindication of the plaintiffs' good name and reputa-
tion without acting as a censoring device on the media.
The "modification" of the rule, however, could be the beginning of
the end of innocent construction in Illinois. Several Illinois appellate
level decisions that preceded the Illinois Supreme Court decision in
Chapski indicated a disfavor of the innocent construction rule because
of the arbitrary nature of its application in not allowing many allegedly
defamatory statements to go to the jury. These courts, however, fol-
lowed the rule as announced in John and waited for the Illinois
Supreme Court to change the rule. As the court in Chapski pointed
out, some of these courts actually applied the rule which was later an-
nounced in Chapski.218 Since the Illinois Supreme Court in Chapski
purported to modify the rule, these appellate courts might look upon
the Chapski rule as the long awaited change of the innocent construc-
tion rule. Chapski, thus, could have a significant impact on Illinois def-
amation law.
Several post-Chapski appellate level decisions applying Chapski
demonstrate the positive and important impact that case will have on
Illinois defamation law. It is apparent that most of the these courts see
Chapski as a restraint on the "free wheeling" discretion of judges and
as providing a greater opportunity to have plaintiffs have their cases
reviewed by a judge. If Illinois courts continue to apply Chapski in this
way, the rights of plaintiffs in vindicating their good name will be bet-
ter served.
In Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc. ,219 the court refused to find
an innocent meaning in an allegedly defamatory statement 220 and
stated that Chapski precludes judges from making "contorted interpre-
tations of language so that it might be seen as innocent."' 221 In Crinkley
v. Dow Jones & Co. 222 the court indicated that Chapski appears to be a
217. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
218. See supra cases cited at note 185.
219. 111 111. App. 3d 1009, 445 N.E.2d 13 (1982).
220. The alleged libel, which was contained in an editorial, referred to the plaintiff as a liar
and included "Jerry Costello lied to us"; "There's no nicer way to put it, he simply lied to us"; "He
did absolutely nothing to protect your interests"; "Just think, we've got two more years of the
Costello brand of lying leadership." Id at 1011, 445 N.E.2d at 15.
221. Id at 1015, 445 N.E.2d at 17.
222. 119 Ill. App. 3d 147, 456 N.E.2d 138 (1983).
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significant change and further signifies the Illinois Supreme Court's
move away from the doctrine of miteor sensus.
223
Another post-Chapski appellate level decision, Cartwright v. Garri-
son,224 however, did not construe Chapski as an attempt to get rid of
the unjust effects of the innocent construction rule in Illinois. In Cart-
wright, the article concerned a closed school board meeting where the
plaintiff was the superintendent of the school district and the defendant
was a school board member. The article stated that the defendant was
presented with a letter at the meeting requesting his resignation and
that the letter dealt with his taking information to the state's attorney.
The allegedly defamatory language was,
Whatever legal ramifications result from that investigation-which
could range from the superintendent losing his certification to crimi-
nal penalties-is up to the state's attorney.
I think that the public will demand changes once all the information
is brought out by the state's attorney.
225
The court applied Chapski and held that the allegedly defamatory
language could not reasonably be interpreted as accusing the plaintiff
of a crime or imputing unfitness of lack of ability on plaintiff's part.2
2 6
The court, therefore, held that the language was not actionable as a
matter of law.2 27 It seems apparent that the Cartwright court decided
the case as it would have before the rule was modified in Chapski. In
223. Id at 151, 456 N.E.2d at 141.
The article complained of in Crinkley reported a statement made be defendant G.D. Searle
and Company in the Wall Street Journal which is published by defendant Dow Jones & Com-
pany. The pertinent portion of the article stated:
In another development, Searle disclosed that two top officers involved in the payment of
$1.3 million to agents of foreign governments to win business abroad have resigned.
William Owens, a director and group vice-president in charge of the medical instruments
division, and Robert Crinkley, president of the radiographics division, quit in early Feb-
ruary. A brief reference to Mr. Owens' resignation was in the annual report but the
reason wasn't mentioned. A spokesman said the two were the only resignations to result
from the disclosures about payoffs.
In February, after the resignations, Searle told the Securities and Exchange Commission
that 'certain members of corporate management were generally aware that some such
payments were being made and, in some instances, authorized the arrangements to make
payments.'
In reference to the possibility of a grand jury indictment and conviction, Mr. Searle
refused to say that any officer found guilty would be fired. That would depend on 'the
nature of the trial and the accusation' he said.
Id at 148-49, 456 N.E.2d at 139. The court held that the article could reasonably be interpreted as
imputing to plaintiff a lack of integrity in the discharge of the duties of his employment and was
thus actionable per se. Id at 152, 456 N.E.2d at 141.
224. 113 Ill. App. 3d 536, 447 N.E.2d 446 (1983).
225. Id at 538, 447 N.E.2d at 447.
226. Id at 542-43, 447 N.E.2d at 449-50.
227. Id The court further held that the second paragraph of the allegedly defamatory lan-
guage could be reasonably read as the defendant's opinion. Id
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Audition Div. Ltd v. Better Business Bureau228 the court noted that
before Chapski, "Courts had strained to find any innocent construc-
tion," but now Chapski requires a "reasonable innocent construc-
tion. ' 229 The court, however, found that the reports complained of
were reasonably capable of an innocent interpretation. 23
0
A further problem with the modified rule in Chapski is the mean-
ing the court intended for the words "per se." The court stated that if
the words can reasonably be read as innocent, they would not be "ac-
tionable per se." It is unclear from the opinion if the Illinois Supreme
Court means that words not actionable per se would be actionable as
libel per quod if a plaintiff could prove special damages.23' If that is
the case, then the Illinois Supreme Court has significantly narrowed the
impact of an innocent construction rule because such an interpretation
was not the case under the rule as announced in John .232 This would
make the rule almost a reasonable construction rule. However, because
the court did not overrule John such a far reaching interpretation was
probably not the intent of the Illinois Supreme Court. Some Illinois
courts, 233 though, have concluded that the rule as announced in Chap-
ski only applies to libel per se and plaintiffs might have a cause of
action if they allege and prove special damages.
228. 120 Ill. App. 3d 254, 458 N.E.2d 115 (1983).
229. Id at 257, 458 N.E.2d at 119.
230. Id at 258, 458 N.E.2d at 119.
The plaintiff in Audition Div. Lid is a talent and modeling agency for children and adults.
The defendant is a not-for-profit corporation which provides verbal and written information to
consumers on its member companies (of which plaintiff is one). It also acts as a clearinghouse
regarding its members. Id at 255, 458 N.E.2d at 117-18. The reports complained of included a
description of the number and types of complaints received by defendant about plaintiff within a
particular period and their resolution, if any. Several of the reports advised parents to read and
understand the contract before signing. Beginning with the January 1980 report, the defendant
also notified consumers that it had been sued by plaintiff. Id at 256-57, 458 N.E.2d at 118.
Plaintiff contended that the reports falsely described its business operation and imply that
plaintiff resorted to dishonest methods of soliciting clients. Plaintiff pointed to a series of state-
ments in the reports which were libelous among them misquoted prices, statements that plaintiff
does not see children prior to audition, that plaintiff pressures clients to sign contracts and that
plaintiff tells parents that their children have a very good chance of working as models. Id at 257,
488 N.E.2d at 118-19. The court held that none of these statements were actionable as libelperse.
Id
231. See supra note 96.
232. See American Pet Motels v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Ass'n., 106 I11. App. 3d 626, 435
N.E.2d 1297 (1982). The court stated that plaintiffs contention that the innocent construction rule
does not apply to libel per quod is difficult to reconcile with the "sweeping language" the Illinois
Supreme Court used in John when it adopted the innocent construction rule. Id at 630, 435
N.E.2d at 1301. The court further stated that the rule said "nonactionable as a matter of law," not
"nonactionable without proof of special damages." Id
233. See Crinkley v. Dow Jones & Co., 119 Ill. App. 3d 147, 456 N.E.2d 138 (1983); Spelson v.
CBS, Inc., No. 82C3780, slip op. (N.D. IU. March 8, 1984); Paul v. Premier Elec. Constr. Co., No.
83C9509, slip op. (N.D. Ill. March 22, 1984).
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In light of these post-Chapski decisions, it is uncertain what the
precise effect of Chapski will be. It must be reemphasized that the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in Chapski did not go far enough. In order to
provide a proper check on judges' discretion, the court should go be-




The doctrine of innocent construction had an interesting history in
Illinois. It was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court long after that
court clearly rejected any form of the common law doctrine of mior
sensus. In adopting the rule, the Illinois Supreme Court simply ig-
nored its contrary precedent. The rule, however, served some justifi-
able ends at the time it was adopted. These justifications no longer
make sense in light of New York Times and Gertz; therefore, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court was proper in reconsidering the innocent construc-
tion rule.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Chapski modified the innocent con-
struction rule by requiring that the judge give a statement an innocent
interpretation only where it is reasonable to do so. While the modifica-
tion was a step in the right direction, the court should have taken the
opportunity to get rid of this rule entirely and line up with the majority
of states which say that any statement which can reasonably be read as
defamatory goes to the jury. However, the impact of Chapski is ques-
234. A possible way of analyzing Chapski would be to read it along with Colson v. Stieg, 89
Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982). In Colson, the court found that a university department chair-
man, in reporting to a tenure committee on a candidate for tenure, was protected by the first
amendment privilege announced in New York Times. Id at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 249. The court
held that it was extending the holding of New York Times to a faculty evaluation committee
meeting. Id A possible broader reading of Colson would be to require any plaintiff to prove
malice on the part of a defendant in the publication of a statement of general public interest. Such
a reading would overrule Troman's negligence standard for private plaintiffs. The broad reading
of Co/son would be advantageous to Illinois defendants in defamation actions, while Chapski
increases the right of plaintiffs.
It could be that the Illinois Supreme Court was only willing to make it easier for an allegation
of defamation to be actionable and thereby benefit the plaintiff after it had first given the defend-
ant extra protection. The reasonably foreseeable combined result of Chapski and Co/son with this
broad reading could be that while more defamation actions get to the jury, plaintiffs will have a
more difficult time establishing their prima facie case because proving malice on the part of a
defendant is a difficult burden for the plaintiff to meet. Thus, the beneficial impact on plaintiffs
may be negligible.
While this is a possible reading of Colson, at least one recent appellate court case has not
extended Colson to all plaintiffs in matters of general public interest. See American Pet Motels,
Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 106 Ill. App. 3d 626, 435 N.E.2d 1297 (1982).
For an extensive discussion of Colson, see Comment, Defamation. Extension of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan to Private Litigants, 59 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1153 (1983).
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tionable since courts which apply the modified rule might use it as a
basis for ignoring innocent construction.
